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Case Notes & Comments 
 
A CHILL WIND BLOWS1: UNDUE BURDEN IN THE WAKE  
OF WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH V. HELLERSTEDT 
CATHERINE GAMPER 
The Supreme Court’s latest addition to its abortion jurisprudence, Whole 
Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt,2 contemplated a Texas abortion regulation 
that required abortion providers throughout the state to meet certain 
standards, including ambulatory surgical center standards and admitting 
privileges requirements.3  The Court struck down the Texas law, grounding 
its decision in its application of the undue burden test4: the regulations were 
unconstitutional because they posed a substantial obstacle in the path of 
women seeking abortions in Texas.5  The Court’s decision in Hellerstedt 
indicates its commitment to the application of the undue burden test.  As 
states continue to enact abortion laws, however, the ever-evolving nature of 
abortion jurisprudence remains unsettled.6 
                                                          
© 2017 Catherine Gamper. 
 1.  This phrase references a quote from Justice Blackmun’s dissenting opinion in Webster v. 
Reproductive Health Services.  492 U.S. 490, 560 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“For today, at 
least, the law of abortion stands undisturbed.  For today, the women of this Nation still retain the 
liberty to control their destinies.  But the signs are evident and very ominous, and a chill wind 
blows.”). 
 J.D. Candidate, 2018, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law.  The author 
thanks her editors, Michael Collins, Michael LaBattaglia, Alexandra Jabs, and Hannah Cole-Chu 
for their valuable and unremitting assistance throughout the writing process.  The author also wishes 
to thank Professor Rena Steinzor, Professor Leslie Meltzer Henry, and the author’s family for their 
unwavering support and guidance.  The author dedicates this Comment to her late mother, Maria 
Rixey Gamper, whose unconditional love made everything possible. 
 2.  136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016). 
 3.  Id.; see infra Part I.B. 
 4.  Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2300; see infra Part I.A.3 (explaining the origin of the undue 
burden test).  A law imposes an undue burden on a woman seeking an abortion if the law has the 
purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a 
non-viable fetus.  Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992).  
 5.  Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2300; see infra Part I.B.  
 6.  As of July 21, 2016, thirty-two states attempted to ban all or some abortions in 2016 and 
fourteen states enacted other abortion regulations such as waiting periods, restrictions on medication 
abortion, and regulations on abortion clinics.  ELIZABETH NASH ET AL., GUTTMACHER INST. LAWS 
AFFECTING REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH AND RIGHTS: STATE TRENDS AT MIDYEAR, 2016 (2016), 
https://www.guttmacher.org/article/2016/07/laws-affecting-reproductive-health-and-rights-state-
trends-midyear-2016. 
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This Comment will first examine the trends underlying both the 
Supreme Court’s and several federal district courts’ analyses of the undue 
burden test.  The Court’s review of abortion regulations has evolved from 
Roe v. Wade’s7 landmark holding that abortion was a fundamental right to 
the introduction of the undue burden test as the constitutional standard of 
review of statutes regulating abortion.8  This Comment will then demonstrate 
that the Court’s abortion jurisprudence is at an inflection point.  With the 
advent of a Trump presidency, and the likelihood of two Trump appointees 
to the Court, the undue burden standard remains subject to change. 
This Comment will argue that, as the Court sits today, abortion 
regulations are analyzed through a dual framework.  Those laws that regulate 
an individual’s access to abortions will likely survive the undue burden test 
while those laws that restrict an abortion provider’s provision of abortions 
will likely fail.9  The effect of the Court’s current abortion jurisprudence, 
however, leaves open an avenue for states to fashion novel and creative 
approaches to regulate abortion that fall somewhere between regulating an 
individual’s access to and a doctor’s provision of abortions.10  Abortion 
providers in states seeking to enact such laws must anticipate and plan for 
such regulations or face clinic closures.  Likewise, women in those states may 
face greater challenges to obtaining abortions in their home states if the 
providers cannot keep up with their legislature’s continuing efforts at 
regulation, which reduces access to the procedure. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A.  The Origin of Abortion as a Fundamental Right: From Roe to 
Casey 
The scope of a woman’s right to an abortion has shifted significantly 
since the mid-twentieth century, from a privacy right to a reproductive 
autonomy right to a quasi-fundamental right.  The Court first established 
early contraceptive rights in Griswold v. Connecticut,11 securing a person’s 
right to obtain contraception because it was included within the broader right 
to marital privacy.12  This Section first describes how the Court grappled with 
the constitutional source of the contraceptive right, ultimately deciding that 
                                                          
 7.  410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 8.  See infra Part I.A.3.  
 9.  See infra Part II.  A law that survives the undue burden test means that a court finds it 
constitutional whereas a law that fails the undue burden test renders it unconstitutional.  See infra 
Part II. 
 10.  See infra Part II.C. 
 11.  381 U.S. 479 (1965).  
 12.  Id. at 486.  
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strict scrutiny applies to laws regulating access to contraceptives.13  Next, this 
Section discusses the well-known decision Roe v. Wade, which established 
the fundamental right to abortion and created the trimester framework to 
determine which level of review to apply to abortion regulations.14  Finally, 
this Section focuses on the status of abortion laws after Roe, as states 
continued to enact laws restricting access to abortion.15  The Court ultimately 
replaced the trimester framework with the undue burden test, which the Court 
continues to apply today.16 
1.  The Right to Abortion Was First Grounded in an Individual’s 
Right to Privacy and Shifted to One Grounded in an Individual’s 
Right to Reproductive Autonomy 
The foundation of the legal right to abortion grew out of the Supreme 
Court’s examination of early contraceptive rights, specifically a married 
couple’s right to determine when and whether to have children without 
intrusion from the state.  In Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court established a 
married couple’s right to use contraceptives based on their fundamental right 
to marital privacy grounded in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.17  In that case, the Court struck down a state law prohibiting 
married couples’ use of contraception based on the privacy right’s 
“recognition” as a “penumbral right[].”18  The majority did not articulate a 
standard of review, but rather indicated that because the right to marital 
privacy was part of the penumbral privacy rights—such as those inherent in 
the First Amendment, Third Amendment, and Fourth Amendment—the 
marital privacy right was also a fundamental right.19  In his concurring 
opinion, Justice Harlan called for strict scrutiny review of laws affecting the 
right to privacy, which he argued was protected under the liberty prong of the 
Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process clause.20  In dissent, Justice 
Black warned of the implications of establishing a fundamental right not 
enumerated in the Constitution.21  Finding a fundamental right to privacy, he 
argued, was akin to the often-stigmatized decision in Lochner v. New York,22 
in which the Court found a fundamental right to contract under the liberty 
                                                          
 13.  See infra Part I.A.1.   
 14.  See infra Part I.A.2. 
 15.  See infra Part I.A.3. 
 16.  See infra Part I.A.3.  
 17.  381 U.S. 479 (1965); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.  The Fourteenth Amendment forbids states 
from depriving any person of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”  Id. 
 18.  Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485.  
 19.  Id. at 483–85.  
 20.  Id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 21.  Id. at 520–22 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 22.  198 U.S. 45 (1905).  
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prong of the Fourteenth Amendment.23  Black argued that the decision in 
Lochner to “liberally use[]” the Due Process Clause to strike down economic 
legislation was a finding that “threaten[ed] . . . the tranquility and stability of 
the Nation” and was “laid . . . to rest once and for all” when Lochner was 
overruled.24  With this split between Justices who found the privacy right 
fundamental on the one hand and, on the other hand, those who rejected the 
notion that the Constitution protected the right to privacy, the future of the 
marital right to privacy endured on rudimentary grounds. 
The Court then shifted its view on the constitutional source of 
contraceptives from one of privacy to one of reproductive autonomy.25  In a 
challenge to a statute prohibiting distribution of contraceptives to unmarried 
couples, the Court struck down the statute on equal protection grounds in 
Eisenstadt v. Baird.26  The Court found that a Massachusetts law prohibiting 
contraceptives to unmarried couples was unconstitutional under rational 
basis review.27  Even though the Court did not apply strict scrutiny,28 this 
decision demonstrated that the Court would treat the right to reproductive 
autonomy, or “the decision whether to bear or beget a child,” as fundamental 
and laws prohibiting such reproductive autonomy would fail under rational 
basis review.29  The Court ultimately determined that strict scrutiny should 
be applied to laws regulating contraceptives in Carey v. Population Services 
International.30  Striking down a New York statute which prohibited anyone 
but a licensed physician from distributing contraceptives, the Court reasoned 
that a state cannot interfere with an individual’s right to make decisions in 
matters of child-bearing.31 
2.  Roe Established Abortion as a Fundamental Right 
The Court established abortion in the first trimester as a fundamental 
right under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in Roe v. 
                                                          
 23.  Griswold, 381 U.S. at 522. 
 24.  Id. (citations omitted) (citing W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); and then 
citing Olsen v. Nebraska ex rel. W. Reference & Bond Ass’n, 313 U.S. 236 (1941)). 
 25.  Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
 26.  Id. at 454–55.  
 27.  Id. at 443–45.  Rational basis review requires a law to be rationally related to a legitimate 
state interest.  United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).  
 28.  Strict scrutiny requires a law to be narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state interest.  
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).  As discussed in Part I.A.3, since Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, laws regulating abortion are not subject to rational basis nor 
strict scrutiny, but rather to the undue burden test.  505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 29.  Id. at 453 (citing Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 
U.S. 535 (1942); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 29 (1905)).   
 30.  431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977).  
 31.  Id. at 688–89.  
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Wade.32  The Court grounded the decision in its creation of a trimester 
framework for determining when the state has a legitimate interest in 
regulating abortion.33  Based on the substantive due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, Justice Blackmun’s majority opinion found a 
fundamental right to terminate a pregnancy during the first trimester of 
pregnancy.34  During the first trimester, the state did not have a compelling 
interest to prohibit abortion.35  During the second trimester, the state could 
regulate abortion to protect the woman’s health, but the state could not 
regulate to protect the fetus until viability.36  During the third trimester, when 
viability was expected, the state could regulate or prohibit abortion except 
when the life or health of the woman was at stake.37 In dissent, Justice 
Rehnquist argued that because abortion is a medical procedure, the state had 
an interest in regulating it just like any other medical procedure and, 
therefore, the Court should have deferred to the states.38 
The right to abortion remained a fundamental right for over twenty 
years, during which time the Court consistently struck down state attempts to 
regulate or prohibit the procedure.  The Court considered cases involving 
state statutes that required second trimester abortions to be performed in a 
hospital, prohibited a doctor from performing an abortion until twenty-four 
hours after the pregnant woman signed a consent form, and required prior 
written consent from a woman’s spouse.39  The Court struck down these 
regulations under the trimester framework established in Roe.40  In a handful 
of cases involving a minor’s access to abortion, however, the Court upheld 
statutes that required parental consent.41 
                                                          
 32.  410 U.S. at 155–56, 164–65.  
 33.  Id. at 164–66.  
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Id. at 163–64 (“With respect to the State’s important and legitimate interest in potential 
life, the ‘compelling’ point is at viability.  This is so because the fetus then presumably has the 
capability of meaningful life outside the mother’s womb.”).   
 36.  Id. (“With respect to the State’s important and legitimate interest in the health of the 
mother, the ‘compelling’ point, in the light of present medical knowledge, is at approximately the 
end of the first trimester.”).  
 37.  Id. at 164–65. 
 38.  Id. at 172–73 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 39.  Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (finding 
informed consent requirements unconstitutional); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 
462 U.S. 416 (1983) (finding twenty-four hour waiting period requirement and hospital requirement 
unconstitutional); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (finding spousal consent 
requirement unconstitutional).  
 40.  Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 759–71; Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. at 430–31; 
Danforth, 428 U.S. at 67–72. 
 41.  H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979).  In Bellotti, 
the Court upheld a minor consent requirement because “the constitutional rights of children cannot 
be equated with those of adults” based on their “peculiar vulnerability” and “their inability to make 
critical decisions in an informed, mature manner.”  Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 634.   
 2017] A CHILL WIND BLOWS 797 
 
3.  Abortion Is No Longer a Fundamental Right After Casey 
Discarded the Trimester Framework and Created the Undue 
Burden Test 
The Court ultimately discarded the trimester framework in Planned 
Parenthood of Southeast Pennsylvania v. Casey42 and instituted the undue 
burden test, which analyzes the purpose of and burdens imposed by abortion 
regulations.43  Before Casey was decided, however, the Court first considered 
reformulating the trimester framework in Webster v. Reproductive Health 
Services,44 a case that challenged the status of the definition of viability relied 
on in Roe.45  Failing to muster a majority vote to overrule Roe, Justice 
Blackmun warned that Roe’s decision would be eroded through state 
legislative initiatives that would enact increasingly restrictive abortion laws 
as “test cases” to challenge Roe’s framework.46   
The reformulation of the trimester framework that began in Webster was 
completed in Casey.  The Casey Court changed the language of the abortion 
debate when, writing for the majority, Justice O’Connor explained that a state 
regulation will impose an undue burden on a woman seeking an abortion if it 
has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a 
woman seeking an abortion of a non-viable fetus.47  In dissent, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, joined by Justices Thomas and White, opined that the majority 
had significantly altered Roe’s meaning, that the right to abortion was no 
longer fundamental, and that the new test will serve only to complicate the 
abortion debate.48  The Court ultimately struck down only one provision of 
the law at issue as imposing an undue burden: the spousal notification 
requirement.49 
The Court first applied the undue burden test in Stenberg v. Carhart,50 
when it considered the constitutionality of a Nebraska statute banning partial-
                                                          
 42.  505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 43.  Id. at 870. 
 44.  492 U.S. 490 (1989). 
 45.  Id. at 501, 518.  The Webster Court explained:  
The key elements of the Roe framework—trimesters and viability—are not found in the 
text of the Constitution or in any place else one would expect to find a constitutional 
principle.  Since the bounds of the inquiry are essentially indeterminate, the result has 
been a web of legal rules that have become increasingly intricate, resembling a code of 
regulations rather than a body of constitutional doctrine. 
Id. at 518. 
 46.  Id. at 538. 
 47.  Casey, 505 U.S. at 846.  
 48.  Id. at 944 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).  
 49.  Id. at 898 (majority opinion) (“A State may not give to a man the kind of dominion over 
his wife that parents exercise over their children.”). 
 50.  530 U.S. 914 (2000). 
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birth abortions.51  Justice Breyer found the statute unconstitutional because it 
posed an undue burden on women by failing to provide a health exception 
for the mother and because its language could be read to prohibit common 
pre-viability procedures.52  The Court applied the undue burden test for a 
second time in Gonzales v. Carhart,53 but upheld the challenged ban on 
partial-birth abortions.54  The decision came following the retirement of 
Justice O’Connor and the appointment of Justice Alito, and concerned a 
statute that banned the practice of partial-birth abortions, even in cases where 
the health of the mother was at stake.55  Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion 
applied rational basis review to the partial-birth abortion ban and ultimately 
deferred to legislative findings on the procedure, such as its gruesome nature 
and threat to the dignity of the medical profession.56  Justice Ginsburg’s 
dissent decried the majority’s neglect of the need to make medical decisions 
on a case-by-case basis, and failure to favor a woman’s health in situations 
where a partial-birth abortion may be medically advised.57 
B.  The Hellerstedt Decision 
In 2013, the Texas legislature passed House Bill 2 (“H.B. 2”),58 which, 
among other provisions, required that all abortion providers have active 
admitting privileges at a hospital no further than thirty miles from the 
abortion provider’s location (“the admitting privileges requirement”).59  The 
bill also mandated that abortion centers meet the minimum standards adopted 
by ambulatory surgical centers (“the surgical center requirement”).60  The 
legislature’s stated purpose of the bill was to “raise the standard and quality 
                                                          
 51.  Id. at 920–22.  Partial-birth abortions or “intact dilation and evacuation (D&X)” or “D&E” 
involves deliberate dilation of the cervix and removal of the fetus from the cervix either intact in 
one pass by partially evacuating the intracranial contents of the living fetus (collapsing the fetus’ 
skull) so that the skull may pass through the cervix.  Id. at 926–29.  At the time of decision, there 
was no reliable reporting on the number of D&X abortions performed annually, but estimates ranged 
between 640 and 5,000 per year.  Id. at 929. 
 52.  Id. at 930.  
 53.  550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
 54.  Id. at 132–33. 
 55.  Id. at 141.  The partial-birth abortion ban allowed an exception for cases where the 
woman’s life was at stake.  Id. 
 56.  Id. at 156–58.  
 57.  Id. at 170–71 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 58.  TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 171.0031, 245.010(a) (West Supp. 2016). 
 59.  Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d 673, 677 (W.D. Tex. 2014), vacated sub 
nom. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 833 F.3d 565 (5th Cir. 2016) (citing HEALTH & 
SAFETY § 171.0031(a)(1); 25 ADMIN. CODE §§ 139.53(c), .56(a)).  
 60.  Id. (citing HEALTH & SAFETY §§ 245.010(a), 243.010; 25 ADMIN. CODE § 139.40).  The 
bill also included a medication abortion provision.  HEALTH & SAFETY § 171.0061.  A discussion 
of medication abortions is beyond the scope of this Comment, as this Comment focuses only on 
surgical abortions.   
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of care for women seeking abortions and to protect the health and welfare of 
women seeking abortions.”61  Abortion clinics had to comply with the 
admitting privileges requirement beginning on October 31, 2013.62  Abortion 
clinics, however, had roughly fourteen months after enactment of the bill 
(September 2014) to meet the standards of the surgical center requirement.63  
This Section first addresses the initial challenges to the bill, which were 
largely unsuccessful and created various preemptive issues for later abortion 
providers challenging the bill. 64  This Section then traces and focuses on the 
procedural posture of the second challenge to the bill.65  Finally, this Section 
outlines the Court’s reasoning and analysis of the current undue burden 
standard in the abortion context.66 
1.  Initial Challenges to H.B. 2: Abbott I and Abbott II 
Shortly after enactment of H.B. 2, several abortion providers filed suit 
in the Western District of Texas, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief 
from the admitting privileges requirement of the bill.67  The court granted 
injunctive relief to the abortion providers.68  Three days later, the Fifth Circuit 
vacated the district court’s injunction, allowing the admitting privileges 
requirement to take effect.69  Several months later, the Fifth Circuit issued an 
opinion reversing in part and affirming in part the district court’s decision.70  
The plaintiffs did not challenge the surgical center provision and they did not 
seek certiorari from the Supreme Court.71 
                                                          
 61.  Whole Woman’s Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563, 576 (5th Cir. 2015), modified, 790 F.3d 
598 (5th Cir. 2015), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. 
Ct. 2292 (2016) (citing SENATE COMM. ON HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., BILL ANALYSIS, TEX. H.B. 
2, 83d Leg., 2d C.S., at 1 (2013)).  
 62.  Id. at 576 n.12. 
 63.  Id. at 576–77.  The surgical center standards fall into three categories of regulation: first, 
“operating requirements” such as record keeping systems, staffing, and cleanliness, 25 TEX. ADMIN. 
CODE §§ 135.4 to .17, 135.26 to .27, second, “fire prevention and general safety requirements,” id. 
§§ 135.41 to .43, and third, “physical plant and construction requirements” such as electrical, and 
plumbing, id. §§ 135.51 to .56. 
 64.  See infra Part I.B.1.  
 65.  See infra Part I.B.2.  
 66.  See infra Part I.B.3. 
 67.  Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 951 F. Supp. 2d 891, 
909 (W.D. Tex. 2013), rev’d in part, 748 F.3d 583 (5th Cir. 2014).  Plaintiffs also sought relief from 
the medication abortion provision of the bill.  Id.  
 68.  Id. 
 69.  Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott (Abbott I), 734 F.3d 
406, 419 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 70.  Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott (Abbott II), 748 F.3d 
583, 605 (5th Cir. 2014). 
 71.  Whole Woman’s Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563, 577 (5th Cir. 2015), modified, 790 F.3d 
598 (5th Cir. 2015), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. 
Ct. 2292 (2016). 
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2.  Procedural Posture 
In April 2014, a group of abortion providers, some of whom were also 
plaintiffs in the Abbott cases, filed suit in the Western District of Texas 
seeking to enjoin the admitting privileges requirement on physicians at two 
abortion facilities and the surgical center requirement.72  The plaintiffs 
claimed that the two provisions violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
Constitution as interpreted in Casey.73  After a bench trial, the district court 
granted the plaintiffs injunctive relief, finding sufficient evidence that the two 
provisions were unconstitutional because the act, operating as a whole, 
placed an “impermissible obstacle” on women seeking pre-viability 
abortions.74 
Relying on the Court’s decisions in Roe and Casey, the district court 
placed considerable weight on the stipulated facts of the case.75  The court 
highlighted the low number of abortion facilities (eight) that would exist in 
Texas if the surgical center requirement went into effect, as well as statistics 
showing that 60,000 to 72,000 legal abortions are performed annually in 
Texas, the second highest rate in the United States.76  Additionally, the court 
found that once the surgical center requirement went into effect, two million 
women would live farther than fifty miles from a legal abortion provider.77  
Arguing that “Roe’s essential holding guarantee[d that] all women, not just 
those of means, [have] the right to a previability abortion,” and distinguishing 
the regulations at issue in Casey,78 the court found that the two provisions at 
issue “erect[ed] a particularly high barrier for poor, rural, or disadvantaged 
women throughout Texas, regardless of the absolute distance they may have 
to travel to obtain an abortion.”79  Accordingly, the court found that the act 
as a whole created obstacles to pre-viability abortion and the “severity of the 
burden imposed by both requirements [was] not balanced by the weight of 
the interests underlying them.”80 
                                                          
 72.  Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d 673 (W.D. Tex. 2014), aff’d in part, 
vacated in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Whole Woman’s Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d (5th Cir. 2015), 
modified, 790 F.3d 598 (5th Cir. 2015), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Whole Woman’s Health v. 
Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016). 
 73.  Id. at 687. 
 74.  Id. at 687–88. 
 75.  Id. at 680–82.  
 76.  Id. at 681. 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  Id. at 683–84 (contrasting the statutes at issue in Casey with the act at issue in Lakey by 
arguing that the challenged requirements in Lakey “are solely targeted at regulating the performance 
of abortions, not the decision to seek an abortion,” as was the case in Casey).  
 79.  Id. at 683. 
 80.  Id. at 684.  
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The Fifth Circuit stayed the district court’s injunction, but the providers 
appealed to the Supreme Court.81  The Supreme Court vacated the Fifth 
Circuit’s stay, which reinstated the district court’s injunction.82  Back before 
the Fifth Circuit, that court found both provisions of the law to be 
constitutional.83  Despite the fact that the Fifth Circuit found that res judicata 
barred plaintiffs from bringing the suit, the court addressed the merits of the 
case, finding that the district court erred in concluding that the statutes were 
unconstitutional.84  Under rational basis review, the Fifth Circuit found that 
both provisions were rationally related to the legitimate state interest of 
ensuring the health and safety of women seeking pre-viability abortions.85  
Further, the court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to prove that the 
legislature had an improper purpose in passing the law and also failed to 
prove that the surgical center requirement imposed an undue burden on a 
large fraction of women for whom it is relevant.86  Regarding the as-applied 
challenges, the challenge to the surgical center requirement as applied to the 
Whole Woman’s Health clinic in McAllen, Texas, and the challenge to the 
admitting privileges requirement as applied to a specific doctor, Dr. Lynn, 
when working at the McAllen clinic, the court affirmed the district court’s 
injunction.87  The court reasoned that the factual contexts of those challenges 
were not yet developed when the Abbott decisions were handed down.88  The 
abortion providers sought certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted.89 
3.  The Hellerstedt Court’s Reasoning 
The Court held that the Texas law posed an undue burden on a woman’s 
right to obtain a pre-viability abortion.  First finding that the claims brought 
by petitioners were not precluded by res judicata, the Court proceeded to the 
merits of the case, grounding its undue burden analysis in three Supreme 
Court decisions90 on abortion.91  On the issue of claim preclusion, the Court 
argued that the claims were significantly different from those raised in the 
                                                          
 81.  Whole Woman’s Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563, 567 n.3 (5th Cir. 2015), modified, 790 F.3d 
598 (5th Cir. 2015), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. 
Ct. 2292 (2016). 
 82.  Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey, 135 S. Ct. 399 (2014) (mem).  
 83.  Cole, 790 F.3d at 567. 
 84.  Id. at 583–84, 598.  
 85.  Id. at 585–86. 
 86.  Id.  
 87.  Id. 
 88.  Id. at 592–98. 
 89.  Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).  
 90.  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 
(1992); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
 91.  Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2300.  
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Abbott cases because they arose from a set of facts developed subsequent to 
the enforcement of the admitting privileges requirement, and which were 
“unknowable” prior to enforcement of the law.92  Further, the two provisions 
had “meaningful differences” with different enforcement dates, and although 
they are part of one overall regulatory scheme, courts should still treat 
challenges to each provision as “separate claims.”93  Writing for the majority, 
Justice Breyer argued that both the admitting privileges and the surgical 
center requirements imposed an undue burden on a woman’s right to a pre-
viability abortion, given the “virtual absence of any health benefit” of the two 
provisions.94 
Regarding the admitting privileges requirement, the Court reasoned that 
the purpose of the requirement was to ensure that women have easy access to 
a hospital in the event complications arise during an abortion procedure.95  
The Court, however, relying on the studies and expert testimony on abortion 
complications considered by the district court, emphasized the district court’s 
finding that the law brought about no such health-related benefit.96  
Considering the surgical center requirement, the Court found that the 
requirement was not based on any differences between abortion procedures 
or other similar surgical procedures related to preserving women’s health.97  
Rather, the requirements such as mandating scrub facilities, having a one-
way traffic pattern, and requiring safeguards for heavily sedated patients are 
both inappropriate and unnecessary because abortions are not performed 
under general anesthesia or deep sedation.98  Finally, the Court argued that 
the high costs of instituting the surgical center standards would result in 
clinics closing, which would neither ensure better care nor increase the 
frequency of better outcomes because the current clinics could have to serve 
five times their usual number of patients.99  In a concurring opinion, Justice 
Ginsburg criticized the Court’s judicial review of any “laws like H.B. 2 that 
‘do little or nothing for health, but rather strew impediments to abortion’” 
and warned that such laws “cannot survive judicial inspection.”100 
                                                          
 92.  Id. at 2306–07. 
 93.  Id. at 2308 (quoting 18 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
§ 4408 (2d ed. 2002, Supp. 2015)). 
 94.  Id. at 2311–19.  
 95.  Id. at 2311 (citing Brief for Respondents at 32–37, Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 
136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016) (No. 15-0274)). 
 96.  Id. at 2312–13. 
 97.  Id. at 2315.  
 98.  Id. at 2315–16. 
 99.  Id. at 2317–18. 
 100.  Id. at 2320–21 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. 
Schimel, 806 F.3d 908, 921 (7th Cir. 2015)).  
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In his dissent, Justice Thomas argued that the majority failed to apply 
the correct standard of review to the law at issue.101  Arguing that the majority 
“rewrote” the undue burden test espoused in Casey in such a way that it 
makes the test “much more akin to strict scrutiny,” Justice Thomas 
highlighted three reasons why the majority erred in its application of the 
test.102  First, he argued that the balancing test used by the majority was not 
in line with the undue burden test in Casey because Casey did not weigh the 
benefits and burdens of the spousal notification law it considered.  Rather, 
Casey focused on the likelihood that the law would prevent women from 
obtaining an abortion.103  Second, he argued that the majority did not respect 
the legislature’s judgment in this situation that involved a medical 
uncertainty.104  Finally, he argued, “the majority overrule[d] another central 
aspect of Casey by” instituting a higher standard than rational basis for 
abortion laws, “even if they do not substantially impede access to 
abortion.”105 
Justice Alito authored a separate dissent joined by Chief Justice Roberts 
and Justice Thomas in which he argued that the Abbott II decision precluded 
the petitioners from bringing suit in Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey.106  
Finding that the two claims were part of the very same transaction (the 
enactment of the two requirements), and that “new and better evidence” does 
not give a plaintiff a new claim on the same set of operative facts, the dissent 
reasoned that issue preclusion barred petitioners from bringing the suit in the 
first place.107  Justice Alito argued further that even if res judicata did not 
apply to the claims, the Texas law was nonetheless constitutional because 
petitioners failed to show that the law posed an undue burden on women 
seeking pre-viability abortions.108  Highlighting that what matters is not the 
law’s effect on the petitioners as abortion providers, but rather the effect on 
patients, the dissent found the petitioners failed to show that the provisions 
had “an unconstitutional impact on at least a ‘large fraction’ of Texas women 
of reproductive age.”109 
In summation, while the abortion right was deemed fundamental in Roe 
because it derived from a woman’s right to privacy and reproductive 
                                                          
 101.  Id. at 2324 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
 102.  Id.  
 103.  Id. (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 893 (1992)).  
 104.  Id. at 2325. 
 105.  Id.  
 106.  Id. at 2330 (Alito, J., dissenting).  
 107.  Id. at 2339–40. 
 108.  Id. at 2342–43.  
 109.  Id. at 2343 (quoting Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 167–68 (2007)).  
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autonomy,110 the abortion right is no longer fundamental.111  Instead, the 
Court grants that the state has a legitimate interest in regulating abortion in 
certain instances,112 such as the use of partial-birth abortions or requiring 
informed parental consent for a minor’s abortion.  The Court, however, 
requires that an abortion regulation not create an undue burden for a woman 
seeking an abortion.113  The Court has found that regulations that pose an 
undue burden include spousal notification requirements, admitting privileges 
requirements, and ambulatory surgical center requirements.114 
II.  ANALYSIS 
In the wake of the Hellerstedt decision, state laws aiming to regulate 
abortion are in a precarious position.  This is because, as a result of the 
holding, future application of the undue burden test remains unclear.  The 
Court currently reviews abortion regulations through a dual framework.  
First, it tends to uphold abortion regulations that relate to women’s safety and 
wellbeing on an individual basis, such as parental consent and waiting 
periods.115  Second, it tends to strike down abortion regulations that are aimed 
at regulating the institutional implementation and accessibility of abortion, 
such as the ambulatory surgical center and admitting privileges requirements 
in Hellerstedt.116  Additionally, the Court is more likely to find an undue 
burden in a law that regulates an aspect of the broader institutional provision 
of abortion, but it is not as likely to find an undue burden in a law that 
regulates an individual’s access to abortion.117 
The difference between provision and access is a subtle one, but the dual 
framework represents the Court’s refusal to treat abortion as a fundamental 
right and instead as a right that can be regulated by states so long as the right 
is not substantially burdened.118  If the dual framework trend continues, the 
future of the abortion right will remain “trapped”119 between states continuing 
                                                          
 110.  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 111.  See supra Part I.A.   
 112.  See supra Part I.A.   
 113.  See supra Part I.A.   
 114.  See supra Part II.B. 
 115.  See infra Part II.A.  
 116.  See infra Part II.B.  
 117.  See infra Parts II.A–B. 
 118.  See infra Parts II.A–B. 
 119.  “Trapped” is the name of a 2016 documentary produced and directed by Dawn Porter, 
which highlights the “TRAP” (“Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers”) laws in several 
southern states, including Texas, Alabama, and Louisiana.  TRAPPED (Trilogy Films 2016).  The 
documentary provided key insight for this Comment into the professional lives of abortion 
providers, physicians, nurses and administrators and the day-to-day impact of abortion laws in their 
clinics.  Id.  
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to fashion new and creative laws regulating abortion on the one hand, and 
courts aiming to make sense of the undue burden standard on the other.120 
Gauging the current Court’s approach to abortion regulations is two-
fold.  First, one must determine what type of abortion regulation is at issue: 
an individual-based regulation or an institutional-based regulation.  Second, 
a court should evaluate the overall impact of the regulation on a woman’s 
access to abortion, weighing the burden of the regulation on a woman seeking 
abortion against the benefit it aims to achieve for that same woman.  This Part 
first discusses the individual-based abortion laws that are consistently upheld 
by the Court.121  Next, this Part examines the institutional-based regulations 
and their failure to pass the undue burden test as espoused in Hellerstedt.122  
Finally, this Part explores possible policy consequences of the undue burden 
standard after Hellerstedt.123 
A.  The Court Upholds Laws Regulating Access to Abortions on 
Individual Basis 
Casey’s undue burden standard peeled away the layer of fundamental 
right protection from the right to abortion, making it possible for states to 
pass more restrictive laws regulating an individual’s access to abortion.  
Several federal appellate courts have found laws that require counseling, 
twenty-four- to forty-eight-hour waiting periods, or parental consent 
requirements, do not impose an undue burden on women seeking 
abortions.124  In applying the undue burden standard, for example, the Court 
in Casey upheld Pennsylvania’s informed consent, twenty-four-hour waiting 
period, and parental consent laws.125  The Casey Court reasoned that while a 
woman has a right to an abortion before viability, states are not prohibited 
from “taking steps to ensure that this choice is thoughtful and informed” and 
“[s]tates are free to enact laws to provide a reasonable framework for a 
woman to make a decision that has such profound and lasting meaning.”126  
Therefore, the Court found that regulations such as requiring a woman to wait 
twenty-four hours between the provision of informed consent information 
                                                          
 120.  See infra Part II.C.   
 121.  See infra Part II.A. 
 122.  See infra Part II.B.  
 123.  See infra Part II.C. 
 124.  See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Minn., N. Dakota, S. Dakota v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889 (8th 
Cir. 2012) (finding constitutional a Minnesota law requiring disclosures of the increased risk of 
suicide to women seeking abortions); Cincinnati Women’s Servs. v. Taft, 468 F.3d 361 (6th Cir. 
2006) (finding constitutional an Ohio law requiring a twenty-four-hour waiting period prior to an 
abortion procedure); Manning v. Hunt, 119 F.3d 254 (4th Cir. 1997) (upholding a North Carolina 
statute requiring parental or judicial consent for a minor’s abortion). 
 125.  Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 880, 887, 899 (1992). 
 126.  Id. at 872–73. 
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and the performance of the abortion did not create an undue burden.127  
Although such regulations may pose “particularly burdensome” financial and 
travel restrictions on women, the twenty-four-hour waiting periods were not 
substantial obstacles to women seeking abortions.128  The Court does not 
ignore the fact that such regulations may make it harder for women to access 
abortions.129  The Court did not find, however, that such obstacles left women 
with no realistic choice.130 
Casey enabled states to increase the barriers to an individual’s decision 
to have an abortion.  States continue to enact laws that institute mandatory 
waiting periods, informed consent procedures, and parental involvement 
regulations, and these laws are considered constitutional because the 
restrictions they place do not amount to an undue burden on the individual’s 
choice to procure an abortion.  For example, the Guttmacher Institute 
reported that as of January 1, 2017, thirty-five states require counseling 
before an abortion, twenty-seven of which also require waiting periods 
(usually twenty-four hours), and thirty-seven states require some type of 
parental involvement in a minor’s decision to have an abortion.131  Further, 
twenty-nine of the thirty-five states that require counseling also require that 
providers give specific information to women seeking abortions, fourteen 
states require that clinics provide in-person counseling before the waiting 
period begins, and three states mandate that an abortion provider perform an 
ultrasound on a woman seeking an abortion.132 
Casey is instructive in these situations, because there the Court made 
clear that even if “a law which serves a valid purpose, one not designed to 
strike at the right itself, has the incidental effect of making it more difficult 
or more expensive to procure an abortion cannot be enough to invalidate 
it.”133  Likewise, though waiting period and informed consent laws may delay 
                                                          
 127.  Id. at 886–87. 
 128.  Id. at 886.  
 129.  Id. at 877–78. 
 130.  See id. (“Regulations which do no more than create a structural mechanism by which the 
State, or the parent or guardian of a minor, may express profound respect for the life of the unborn 
are permitted, if they are not a substantial obstacle to the woman’s exercise of the right to choose.”). 
 131.  Counseling and Waiting Periods for Abortion, GUTTMACHER INST., 
https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/counseling-and-waiting-periods-abortion (last 
updated Jan. 1, 2017); Parental Involvement in Minors’ Abortions, GUTTMACHER INST., 
https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/parental-involvement-minors-abortions (last 
updated Jan. 1, 2017).  The Guttmacher Institute is a “research and policy organization committed 
to advancing sexual and reproductive health and rights in the United States and globally.”  About 
Us, GUTTMACHER INST., https://www.guttmacher.org/about (last visited Apr. 2, 2017).  All data is 
as of January 1, 2017. 
 132.  Counseling and Waiting Periods for Abortion, supra note 131; Requirements for 
Ultrasound, GUTTMACHER INST., https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/requirements-
ultrasound (last updated Jan. 1, 2017).  
 133.  Casey, 505 U.S. at 874.  
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the abortion procedure, the effect on individuals exercising their choice to 
obtain an abortion, without more, is not substantial enough to invalidate 
them.134  In a study conducted by the Guttmacher Institute in 2014, 
researchers found that seventy-six percent of patients could obtain abortions 
within seven days of making the appointment.135  Further, fifty-four percent 
of these women lived in a state without a waiting period, twenty-four percent 
lived in a state with a waiting period that required in-person counseling, and 
twenty-two percent lived in a state with a waiting period but no required in-
person counseling.136  On an individual basis, women who face obstacles, 
such as having to wait twenty-four hours before the abortion, are still able to 
access the abortion clinics and providers, thereby not unduly restricting their 
right to choose an abortion. 
B.  The Court Finds That Laws Regulating Institutional Aspects of the 
Provision of Abortion Impose an Undue Burden 
Hellerstedt represents the Court’s most recent analysis and application 
of the undue burden standard, and highlights the Court’s unwillingness to 
uphold state laws that require providers to meet standards that it views as 
unrealistic, difficult to implement, or result in closing abortion clinics 
statewide.  The Hellerstedt Court found the Texas admitting privileges and 
ambulatory surgical center requirements imposed an undue burden on 
women in the state because, once the law went into effect, only about seven 
or eight abortion clinics in the state could remain open.137  These remaining 
clinics would not be able to meet the demand for abortion in the State of 
Texas, where 60,000 to 72,000 women seek abortions every year.138  The 
Court emphasized the drastic effect such laws would have on abortion clinics 
and their consequent failure to adequately meet the demonstrated demand of 
Texas women for abortions.139  If the Texas law were to go into effect, women 
seeking abortions in Texas would have to “travel long distances to get 
abortions in crammed-to-capacity superfacilities” and such facilities, 
“attempting to accommodate sudden, vastly increased demand, may find that 
                                                          
 134.  See id. (“Only where state regulation imposes an undue burden on a woman’s ability to 
make this decision does the power of the State reach into the heart of the liberty protected by the 
Due Process Clause.”).   
 135.  RACHEL K. JONES & JENNA JERMAN, GUTTMACHER INST., TIME TO APPOINTMENT AND 
DELAYS IN ACCESSING CARE AMONG U.S. ABORTION PATIENTS 1 (2016).  
 136.  Id. 
 137.  Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2316 (2016). 
 138.  Id. 
 139.  Id. at 2318.  
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quality of care declines.”140  Contrary to laws requiring women be fully 
informed and wait twenty-four hours before proceeding with their choice to 
have an abortion, the laws struck down in Hellerstedt created an undue 
burden on women.  The Court found the obstacles so substantial to women 
seeking an abortion in Texas that the laws could be seen as eliminating the 
woman’s ability to choose an abortion in the first place.141 
As states enact similar laws that regulate physician and hospital 
requirements, Hellerstedt appears to sound the death knell for the 
constitutional status of those laws.  For example, the Virginia Board of Health 
recently voted in an 11-4 decision to remove regulations on abortion 
facilities.142  The Virginia regulations included provisions similar to those at 
issue in Hellerstedt, such as requiring abortion providers “to meet hospital-
like building standards.”143  An attorney speaking on behalf of the Virginia 
Attorney General’s Office stated that in light of Hellerstedt, Virginia’s 
regulations “would not likely survive a constitutional challenge.”144  
Similarly, in Burns v. Cline,145 the Supreme Court in Oklahoma struck down 
abortion provisions requiring strict licensing and inspection schemes for 
abortion facilities.146  In a concurring opinion, Vice Chief Justice Combs 
pointed to Hellerstedt’s espousal of Casey’s undue burden standard, and 
conducted an undue burden analysis of the Oklahoma law, stating that the 
law “create[d] an open-ended array of regulatory hurdles that subject 
practitioners to harsh penalties for any potential violation” and that the law 
“will make it considerably more difficult for providers to operate, and 
accordingly will make it more difficult for the women of Oklahoma to 
exercise their federally-recognized constitutional right to control their own 
reproductive futures.”147 
Finally, the most recent and relevant federal case since the Hellerstedt 
decision is one from the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of 
                                                          
 140.  Id. (citation omitted) (citing Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d 673, 682 
(W.D. Tex. 2014), vacated sub nom. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 833 F.3d 565 (5th Cir. 
2016)). 
 141.  Id. 
 142.  Katie Demeria, Virginia Board of Health Votes to Remove Contested Abortion 
Regulations, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH (Oct. 24, 2016, 10:15 PM), 
http://www.richmond.com/news/virginia/government-politics/article_c49cb635-65d6-5b25-b344-
e00f48afe8cc.html; VIRGINIA STATE BOARD OF HEALTH, MEETING MINUTES 6 (Oct. 24, 2016).  
 143.  Demeria, supra note 142. 
 144.  Id. (quoting a statement by Cynthia Bailey with the state Attorney General’s office to the 
Virginia Board of Health during a specially scheduled meeting to vote on pending abortion 
regulations in the state). 
 145.  382 P.3d 1048 (Okla. 2016). 
 146.  Id.  
 147.  Id. at 1057 (Combs, V.C.J., concurring). 
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Alabama, West Alabama Women’s Center v. Miller,148 in which a federal 
district court found that two abortion regulation provisions, a school-
proximity provision and a fetal-demise provision, imposed undue burdens on 
women seeking abortions in the state.149  The court relied on Hellerstedt to 
show that “imposing substantial costs on abortion providers to comply with 
a statute places burdens on women’s access to abortion—regardless of the 
financial circumstances of the clinics.”150  Because the Alabama law would 
force two out of only five abortion clinics in the State to close, the court found 
two important results making this effect an undue burden on women in 
Alabama.151  First, the closure of the two clinics would eliminate a woman’s 
right to choose to have an abortion after fifteen weeks of pregnancy because 
those were the only clinics performing such abortions in Alabama.152  
Second, the closure of the two clinics would force women in Alabama to 
travel great distances to obtain pre-fifteen week abortions.153  The federal 
court also made a significant commentary on the nature of the undue burden 
standard: that the “analysis must have bite.”154  This case seems to suggest 
that in the wake of Hellerstedt, a stricter undue burden test is at play in 
abortion jurisprudence, and laws that burden abortion providers and women 
through large-scale institutional regulations will not survive. 
C.  Policy Consequences 
In states aiming to continue enforcing abortion regulations, abortion 
providers and women seeking abortions will face challenging obstacles that 
a potentially right-leaning Court could uphold as constitutional.  While 
Hellerstedt was celebrated as a “win” for women’s reproductive rights 
advocates,155 the legal challenges will continue as states and courts grapple 
                                                          
 148.  No. 2:15cv497-MHT (WO) (M.D. Ala. Oct. 27, 2016), appeal filed No. 16-17296 (11th 
Cir. Nov. 29, 2016).  
 149.  Id. at 97–101.  The school-proximity law prohibited the health department from issuing or 
renewing licenses to abortion clinics that perform abortions located within 2,000 feet of a K-8 public 
school.  Id. at 15.  The fetal-demise law imposed a criminal penalty on physicians who “purposely 
perform ‘dismemberment abortions’” which would include the banning of the standard D&E 
method “if used without first inducing fetal demise.”  Id. at 60–61. 
 150.  Id. at 35. 
 151.  Id. at 36. 
 152.  Id. at 36–37. 
 153.  Id. at 38–39. 
 154.  Id. at 49. 
 155.  See, e.g., Samantha Allen, Supreme Court’s Texas Decision Is the Greatest Victory for 
Abortion Rights Since Roe v. Wade, DAILY BEAST (June 27, 2016, 11:06 AM), 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2016/06/27/supreme-court-s-texas-decision-is-the-greatest-
victory-for-abortion-rights-since-roe-v-wade.html (praising the Court’s decision); Melissa 
Batchelor Warnke, Opinion, The Supreme Court Ruling Is an Abortion-Rights Victory. But It 
Doesn’t Guarantee Access to Services, L.A. TIMES (June 28, 2016, 2:36 PM), 
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/opinion-la/la-ol-supreme-court-abortion-texas-clinics-20160628-
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with which regulations constitute an undue burden and which regulations do 
not.  Planned Parenthood has filed several lawsuits in state and federal court 
challenging abortion regulations in Alaska, Missouri, and North Carolina that 
are markedly similar to the regulations struck down in Hellerstedt.156  
Alaska’s law bans abortion in the first trimester of pregnancy, which forces 
many women to travel outside the state to obtain an abortion.157  North 
Carolina’s law bans abortions after the twentieth week of pregnancy and 
includes a narrow health exception in extreme health emergencies.158  In 
Missouri, the restrictions have closed all but one health center that provides 
abortions in the state.159 
Even with the dual framework discussed above,160 one can ponder the 
myriad new ways in which a state may seek to regulate abortion.  Even 
though Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence warned about the unconstitutionality 
of future “laws like H.B. 2,”161 the future of such laws are still at the mercy 
of the undue burden test. 
1.  States Continue to Pass Restrictive Abortion Legislation Which 
Tests the Boundaries of the Undue Burden Test 
The Court added a new dimension to its undue burden jurisprudence 
when it upheld the partial-birth abortion ban.162  The earliest application of 
the undue burden test was in the Court’s review of the distinctive partial-birth 
abortion ban in Stenberg v. Carhart.163  Finding the ban imposed an undue 
burden on women seeking abortion, the Court struck down the law because 
it lacked a life and health exception for the woman.164  With new 
                                                          
snap-story.html (noting that the Court’s decision was an “abortion-rights victory”); Sara 
Rosenbaum, When Common Sense and Public Health Prevail: Whole Woman’s Health v. 
Hellerstedt, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (July 1, 2016), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2016/07/01/when-
common-sense-and-public-health-prevail-whole-womens-health-v-hellerstedt/ (explaining the 
Court’s decision); Mary Tuma, An Undue Burden: Supremes Vindicate Pro-Choice Texans, AUSTIN 
CHRON. (July 1, 2016), http://www.austinchronicle.com/news/2016-07-01/an-undue-burden-
supremes-vindicate-pro-choice-texans/ (explaining that “Texas women won a rare victory”). 
 156.  John Kennedy, Alaska, Missouri, North Carolina Sued over Abortion Laws, LAW360 (Nov. 
30, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/867414/alaska-missouri-north-carolina-sued-over-
abortion-laws. 
 157.  Id. 
 158.  Id. 
 159.  Id. 
 160.  See supra Part II.B.  
 161.  Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2321 (2016) (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring).  
 162.  550 U.S. 124, 168 (2007); see supra note 51 (describing the partial-birth abortion 
procedure). 
 163.  530 U.S. 914 (2000); see supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
 164.  See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
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appointments to the Court,165 and a new challenge to a similar partial-birth 
abortion ban, the Court again applied the undue burden test in Gonzales v. 
Carhart.166  The second time around, the Court upheld the partial-birth 
abortion ban.167  With no discernible difference between the two statutes at 
issue in Carhart and Gonzales, the Court reflected a shift in its rationale as 
new Justices applied the same undue burden test in different ways.  Relying 
on legislative findings as to partial-birth abortion’s gruesome nature and its 
potential threat to the dignity of the medical profession, the Court found that 
the ban did not pose an undue burden on women, even in cases where the 
health of the mother was at stake.168 
Gonzales thus represents a high-water mark in the Court’s abortion 
jurisprudence.  While the Court found that a law requiring spousal 
notification imposed an undue burden,169 it did not find an undue burden in a 
law that entirely prohibited a form of abortion, even when the mother’s health 
is at risk.170  Contrary to Casey’s finding that a spousal notification provision 
imposed an undue burden on a woman because it potentially endangered the 
life of the mother in an abusive relationship, the Gonzales Court seems to 
shift its focus away from this concern. What is unique about Gonzales is the 
moral and ethical problem posed by the partial-birth abortion procedure.171  
The Court noted that “Congress could nonetheless conclude that the type of 
abortion proscribed by the Act requires specific regulation because it 
implicates additional ethical and moral concerns that justify a special 
prohibition.”172  A comprehensive exploration and analysis of the ethical and 
moral considerations of abortion are beyond the scope of this Comment,173 
but the Court will not avoid drawing boundaries when legislative findings 
                                                          
 165.  See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
 166.  550 U.S. 124 (2007); see supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
 167.  See supra note 54 and accompanying text.  
 168.  See supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text. 
 169.  Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 170.  Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 168. 
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 172.  Id. (emphasis added). 
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indicate a close proximity between “practices that extinguish life” and 
“actions that are condemned.”174 
Likewise, some recent state laws regulating abortion shift the focus from 
ensuring the health and safety of the mother to preserving the dignity of the 
fetus.  The Texas Department of State Health Services instituted new 
requirements for the disposal of fetal remains, including prohibiting the 
disposal of fetal tissue in landfills and eliminating other forms of fetal tissue 
disposition to “afford protection and dignity to the unborn consistent with the 
Legislature’s expression of its intent.”175  Initially drafted to go into effect by 
the end of December 2016, the U.S. District Court for the Western District 
of Texas delayed the implementation of the rule until January 27, 2017.176  
Abortion rights groups filed suit against the State of Texas, citing Hellerstedt 
as declaring “that medically unnecessary restrictions on abortion access are 
unconstitutional.”177  These groups claim that requiring fetal burials or 
cremations imposes a cost on abortion providers that may then be passed on 
to women, and further, that such requirements serve no health benefit.178  The 
Texas Attorney General issued a statement that he is confident that the court 
will rule for the state as “Texas values the dignity of the remains of the unborn 
and believes that fetal tissue should be disposed of properly and 
humanely.”179 
Without a court opinion on the validity of these laws, one can only 
hypothesize whether they constitute an undue burden or not.  What remains 
clear is that the undue burden standard is the applicable standard, and if a law 
can be fashioned that does not create a substantial obstacle to a woman 
seeking an abortion, then it should be constitutional.180  If the fetal burial laws 
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 175.  Definition, Treatment, and Disposition of Special Waste from Health Care-Related 
Facilities, 41 Tex. Reg. 9709 (Dec. 9, 2016). 
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Reproductive Rights, an abortion rights groups). 
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https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/news/releases/ag-paxton-releases-statement-on-fetal-
remains-disposition-hearing). 
 180.  See supra notes 121–134 and accompanying text. 
 2017] A CHILL WIND BLOWS 813 
 
do not impose such an extraordinary cost on abortion providers that they will 
need to close their clinics, then these laws may be upheld. 
2.  Abortion Providers’ Ability to Stay Open Statewide Will Be 
Integral to Determining Whether an Abortion Regulation 
Imposes an Undue Burden 
As Hellerstedt shows, the Court has not pinpointed a statistical threshold 
for when a regulation creates an undue burden.  But, the Court will take 
seriously those statistics that reflect abortion clinic closures statewide and a 
drastic increase in travel times to clinics—for example, if a woman would 
need to travel to another state.  When an abortion regulation forces a clinic 
closure, the regulation entirely removes a place that a woman could go to get 
an abortion.  Therefore, the Court has considered forced closure to be the 
greatest burden.  As states fashion innovative abortion regulations,181 
abortion providers may have the ability to anticipate and plan for such 
restrictions.  Consequently, providers would be unable to argue that the laws 
will force them to close down, and thus these new laws may not meet the 
undue burden standard as applied in Hellerstedt.  This situation “traps” 
abortion providers, for if they can meet the regulations, even at the risk of 
treating a smaller number of women, then some individual women will face 
greater obstacles in securing an abortion.  If the providers can meet the 
regulations, but decide not to in order to meet as much of the demand for the 
procedure as possible, the providers may lose any constitutional basis for 
challenging the regulations. 
An instructive example of this issue is the Ohio Department of Health’s 
closure of the only remaining abortion clinic in Dayton in November 2016 
because the clinic failed to obtain a required transfer agreement with a nearby 
hospital in cases of emergency.182  While the lawyer for the clinic is 
“confident” that the clinic will remain open during an appeal of the 
Department of Health’s decision, the closure of this facility would bring the 
total number of abortion providers in the state to eight, of which several are 
already involved in legal fights to remain open.183  The regulations at issue 
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resemble Texas’ H.B. 2 in that they require abortion clinics to have 
“emergency backup agreements with nearby hospitals,” and specific 
physicians listed as able and willing to perform the abortions.184  The Dayton 
abortion clinic has been unable to fulfill this requirement since 2002, because 
many physicians are targeted or harassed by anti-abortion activists if their 
names are publicized as part of the emergency backup agreement.185  Ohio’s 
State Representative Greta Johnson doubted the regulation’s ability to 
withstand legal scrutiny in light of the Hellerstedt decision.186  The closure 
of the last remaining Dayton abortion clinic is significant because the burden 
posed by this closure is indicative of finding the same undue burden found in 
Hellerstedt. 
3.  The Future of the Abortion Right Under the Trump Administration 
May Be Upended by a Review of the Undue Burden Test and 
Abortion Jurisprudence 
The Trump administration may upend the undue burden jurisprudence 
entirely and usher in a new era of abortion regulations, which would return 
abortion regulation to the states.187  Then President-elect Trump stated, in a 
60 Minutes interview in December 2016, that the abortion right is not settled 
whereas the same-sex marriage law is.188  With his ability to appoint only one 
Justice at this time, however, whom he has noted “will be pro-life,”189  
President Trump will be limited by the Court’s complicated abortion 
framework and its consistent, albeit somewhat fragmented, protection of a 
woman’s right to choose.  For example, President Trump indicated that a 
woman might have to go to another state to get an abortion if she cannot get 
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one in her own state.190  With the appointment of Judge Neil Gorsuch to the 
Supreme Court, President Trump has tapped a Justice that is known for his 
conservative jurisprudence on religion, physician-assisted suicide, and the 
“right” to die.191  For example, in Judge Gorsuch’s 2006 book on physician-
assisted suicide, he “outline[s] the moral, legal, and logistical challenges that 
emerge at the end of life.”192  Gorsuch’s position on the Tenth Circuit in the 
Hobby Lobby v. Sebelius193 case further highlights the role that religion may 
play in his future Supreme Court jurisprudence.194 
President Trump has noted that the abortion debate “has a long, long 
way to go.”195  Hellerstedt’s decision shows just how long, because the Court 
found that women resorting to out of state abortions constituted an undue 
burden and were thus unconstitutional.196  To get around this impediment, 
future appointees to the Court, including Judge Gorsuch, will likely follow 
Justice Alito’s statistical approach197 in which he looked at the small fraction 
of all women of reproductive age whom the regulations affect, rather than the 
much larger fraction of women seeking abortion whom the regulations 
affect.198  Either way, the future of the undue burden test may rely on the 
Justices’ views on which statistics govern the analysis. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
Although a woman no longer has a fundamental right to abortion,199 
Supreme Court abortion jurisprudence has reflected a steady commitment to 
protecting a woman’s right to choose whether to have an abortion in the early 
stages of pregnancy.200  This choice, however, does not come without a cost 
                                                          
 190.  Id.  
 191.  See Emma Green, Trump Picks a Bioethicist for the Supreme Court, ATLANTIC (Feb. 1, 
2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/02/trump-bioethics-supreme-court/5152 
50/ (noting Judge Gorsuch’s interest in “matters of life and death”). 
 192.  Id. (citing NEIL GORSUCH, THE FUTURE OF ASSISTED SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA (2006)). 
 193.  723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013); see also Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) 
(holding that closely held for-profit companies may be exempt from a regulation imposing 
mandatory insurance coverage for contraceptive care based on religious objections). 
 194.  Green, supra note 191 (“His most lasting legacy from his time on the Tenth Circuit Court 
of Appeals is likely Hobby Lobby vs. Sebelius, a case about religious objections to the rules on birth-
control coverage in the Affordable Care Act, which later became a landmark Supreme Court 
decision.”). 
 195.  S.M., supra note 188. 
 196.  Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016). 
 197.  Id. at 2330 (2016) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 198.  Id.; see also Neil S. Siegel, The Distinctive Role of Justice Alito: From a Politics of 
Restoration to a Politics of Dissent, 126 YALE L.J. F. 164, 166 (2016) (discussing Justice Alito’s 
methodology and jurisprudence). 
 199.  See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 200.  See supra Part I.B.   
 816 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 76:792 
 
nor without significant conditions to both women and abortion providers.201  
The undue burden test guides policymakers to fashion laws that do not place 
a substantial obstacle in the path of women seeking abortion.202  The dual 
framework analysis suggested in this Comment cannot encompass every 
possible abortion regulation that may fit neatly into one of the two categories, 
either individually based regulations or institutionally based regulations.  As 
Gonzales shows, certain unique situations, such as the partial-birth abortion 
procedure, reflect the Court’s commitment to protecting the state’s interest in 
protecting the life of a fetus.203 
In the wake of Hellerstedt, abortion providers had cause to celebrate,204 
as many clinics remained open and no longer had to meet restrictive 
regulations.205  The Court’s application of the undue burden test reflects a 
rejection of “TRAP” laws, and the consequent legal battles over laws like 
Texas H.B. 2 further reflect judicial disapproval of these laws.206  
Nevertheless, restrictive regulations of abortion are increasing.207  Rather 
than enacting laws that impose significant restrictions which often lead to 
automatic closures of abortion providers,208 states are fashioning laws that 
are not as strict, and do not produce as drastic an effect on abortion 
providers.209  The laws, however, place a burden on abortion providers by 
imposing a hard choice between serving much fewer women or closing.210  
Unless clinics are forced to close in a clear and sweeping fashion, as often 
results from regulations aimed at the institutional and foundational aspects of 
the clinics,211 the undue burden standard may not offer much relief. 
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